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ABSTRACT
Mobile app users e-sign terms of service (ToS) and privacy policy
agreements (PPA) on a daily basis, oftentimes without reviewing them.
This practice is problematic because ToS and PPA include considerable
“ethical risks,” that are, questionable elements that they would not reason-
ably expect to find in these agreements.
This Article introduces a novel conceptual framework and compre-
hensive typology for analyzing ethical risks in ToS and PPA of mobile apps.
The proposed typology is the first to integrate ethical risks stemming from
both ToS and PPA into a single coherent framework.  Furthermore, the
typology addresses the identified risks in terms of both the rights violated
and the concrete business and legal practices that create them.  Based on
this thorough analysis, the Article argues that the legal mechanisms of ToS
and PPA do not achieve their purposes.  ToS and PPA often legalize ethi-
cal risks by obtaining users’ consent to terms that users may not fully un-
derstand.  As such, rather than protecting users, ToS and PPA frequently
perpetuate users’ vulnerabilities and subject them to rights-infringing
measures.
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In addition, the Article examines the scope of protection against the
identified ethical risks that is awarded by landmark laws in the area of
digital privacy and consumer protection: The General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), the Consumer Rights Directive of the European
Union (EU), the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), and the Cali-
fornia Privacy Rights Act (CPRA).
The Article concludes with a discussion of its practical implications,
which can have far-reaching consequences for privacy protection and con-
sumer protection regulation.  These implications include guidance for de-
veloping new regulatory and decision-support tools, improving consumer
understanding of ethical risks, and assisting mobile app providers in draft-
ing ethical user agreements.
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/1
2021] RISKY FINE PRINT 485
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
I. FRIEND OR FOE? MOBILE APP AGREEMENTS AS REGULATORY
MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTING USERS’ AUTONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . 489
II. ETHICAL RISKS OF MOBILE APPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
A. Ethical Risks Arising from the Content of ToS and PPA . . . . . 494
B. Ethical Risks That Stem from Users’ Lack of Informed
Decision-Making Regarding ToS and PPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
1. The Term “Privacy Policy” Misleads Users Into Thinking
That Their Privacy Is Protected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
2. Users Do Not Read the Terms of Service and Privacy
Policy Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
3. Users Do Not Attribute Adequate Weight to the Cost of
Privacy Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
C. Ethical Risks That Are External to ToS and PPA . . . . . . . . . . . 497
1. Information Security Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
2. Identity Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
3. Online Manipulation Based on Collected (and
Transferred) Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
III. NOVEL TYPOLOGY OF ETHICAL RISKS ARISING FROM THE
CONTENT OF TOS AND PPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
A. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
B. Analysis and Results: The Ethical Risks Typology . . . . . . . . . . . 500
1. Uninformed Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
a. Unspecific Consent to the Service Provided . . . . 503
i. Broad Purpose Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
ii. Lack of Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
b. Limited User Data Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
i. Inability to Delete User Account Data . . . . . 506
ii. Inability to Condition Over a Specific
Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
iii. Content Removal Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
iv. Unilateral Termination Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
v. Unilateral Change Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
vi. Unilateral Changes of Financial Charges . . . 509
2. Restricting User Legal Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
a. Mandatory Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
b. Choice of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
c. Choice of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
d. Limitation of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
3. Limited Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
a. Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
b. Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
c. Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
d. Misleading or Unclear Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
3
Mizrahi: Risky Fine Print: A Novel Typology of Ethical Risks in Mobile App
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
486 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 483
e. Difficulty of Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
4. Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
a. Creation of User Profiles that Negatively Affect
Future Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
b. Personal Information that May Be Used to
Discriminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
c. Using Profiles for Undeclared Purposes . . . . . . . 518
d. Creation of Aggregated Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
5. Processing User Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
a. Transforming Meta-Data Into Significant User
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
b. Aggregating and Combining User Information
From Multiple Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
6. Tracking User Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
a. Tracking User Activities While Users Are Not
Using the App (Cookies) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
7. Third-Party Data Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
IV. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/1
2021] RISKY FINE PRINT 487
INTRODUCTION
IN today’s digital era, mobile devices and digital applications (apps)have become an indispensable part of everyday life.  These apps have
made many things simpler and more accessible.  At the same time, mobile
apps have inherent costs of which many users are likely unaware, includ-
ing violations to one’s right to autonomy, privacy, non-discrimination,
freedom of expression, and consumer protection.
The terms of service (ToS) and privacy policy agreements (PPA) of
these apps supposedly provide users with the information they need to
weigh the costs and benefits of using the app and provide their informed
consent to the terms and practices that are specified in them.  However,
ToS and PPA—the main tools used to define the legal relationship be-
tween users and mobile app providers—are generally long, complex, and
difficult to understand.  Furthermore, due to the prevalence of mobile
apps, users are asked to sign many ToS and PPA.  For these reasons, users
tend to automatically sign these documents without reading them—i.e.,
without providing their informed consent to the terms.  This practice is
problematic because ToS and PPA are legally binding documents that may
include unethical provisions that users do not reasonably expect.1 This
Article refers to these issues as “ethical risks.”
This Article presents a novel typology of the ethical risks that are hid-
den within ToS and PPA.  Based on this thorough analysis, the Article ar-
gues that the legal mechanisms of ToS and PPA do not achieve their
purposes.  ToS and PPA often legalize ethical risks by obtaining users’ con-
sent to terms that they may not fully understand.  As such, rather than
protecting users, ToS and PPA frequently perpetuate users’ vulnerabilities
and subject them to rights-infringing measures.
To construct a novel comprehensive typology of ethical risks, this Arti-
cle employs a methodology of qualitative thematic analysis.  This included
an extensive qualitative review of numerous sources from the fields of digi-
tal apps, big data, and data analysis, including academic publications, re-
ports of privacy agencies, consumer protection agencies and non-
government organizations (NGOs), various regulations, and other govern-
mental and legislative papers.
The proposed typology provides a conceptual framework for consid-
ering ethical risks in ToS and PPA.  It offers several novel contributions;
previous studies that dealt with risks in PPA of digital apps are limited in
that they narrowly address only privacy violations rather than a more com-
1. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps,
and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse,
BYU J. OF PUB. L. 26, 18–19, 22–23 (2012); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Reali-
ties of Online Contracting, 19 SUP.  CT.  ECON.  REV. 11–13 (2011); Florencia Mar-
otta-Wurgler & Daniel L. Chen, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 95–97 (2012).
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prehensive framework of ethical risks.2  In addition, previous empirical
studies aimed at uncovering ethical risks in PPA are based on a risk typol-
ogy developed by computer scientists rather than by legal domain ex-
perts.3  Moreover, by examining ethical risks in both ToS and PPA, the
proposed typology in this research addresses ethical risks that go beyond
privacy violations, discussing user vulnerability with respect to an ex-
panded set of rights, including the rights to autonomy, non-discrimina-
tion, freedom of expression, and consumer protection.  This broader
conceptualization of ethical risks in PPA and ToS of mobile apps is neces-
sary for the development of a comprehensive policy solution that could
address the multitude of problems that they pose.
The proposed typology can be effectively applied across a multitude
of fields and for a variety of purposes.  First and foremost, the typology is
intended to improve the accessibility and comprehensibility of ethical risks
in ToS and PPA.  Therefore, the typology can be used to educate users
and help them make informed decisions regarding the apps they choose
to use and the manner in which they use them.  The typology and analysis
may also help mobile app providers draft more ethical ToS and PPA.  Fur-
thermore, the findings may prompt privacy protection and consumer pro-
tection regulators to broaden the scope of their regulation and
enforcement activities and to reconsider the regulatory requirements in
this domain (thus mitigating the identified ethical risks to users).  Moreo-
ver, the typology forms a useful baseline for empirical studies that address
user perceptions of ethical risks, as well as for studies that seek to analyze
the contents of PPA and ToS.  Specifically, it can serve as the basis for the
work of computer scientists who develop automated tools to identify ethi-
cal risks in apps.
This Article includes four parts: Part I explains the terms ToS and
PPA and raises the question of whether they are the right tools to protect
user rights, in particular users’ right to autonomy.  Part II reviews the con-
cept of ethical risks in mobile apps and divides the different risks into
three categories: (1) ethical risks arising from the content of ToS and PPA;
(2) ethical risks that stem from users’ lack of informed decision-making
regarding ToS and PPA; and (3) ethical risks external to ToS and PPA.
Part III explores and explicates the first category of risks and presents a
typology of ethical risks arising from the content of ToS and PPA and how
these risks violate user autonomy.  Additionally, it examines how the four
key laws in the area of digital privacy and consumer protection—the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Consumer Rights Directive
2. See Vinayshekhar Bannihatti Kumar et al., Quantifying the Effect of In-Domain
Distributed Word Representations: A Study of Privacy Policies, in AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM
ON PRIVACY-ENHANCING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LANGUAGE TECHNOLOGIES 46
(2019); Welderufael B. Tesfay et al., I Read but Don’t Agree: Privacy Policy Benchmark-
ing Using Machine Learning and the EU GDPR, in COMPANION PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WEB CONFERENCE 163 (2018).
3. Supra note 2.
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of the European Union (EU), the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), and the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)—protect (or fail to
protect) against the ethical risks identified in the typology.  Part IV dis-
cusses the typology’s potential applications.
I. FRIEND OR FOE? MOBILE APP AGREEMENTS AS REGULATORY
MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTING USERS’ AUTONOMY
In recent years, an acceleration in technological developments has
affected virtually every area of our lives and changed the way we interact,
work, and think.  Many of these changes are positive and have upgraded
our quality of life.4  For example, the various social apps (e.g., Facebook,
Instagram, and TikTok) provide people with access to information and
the ability to connect with family and friends easily, quickly, and comforta-
bly.5  Some apps also target specific audiences by offering personalized
products, and thus, the search for relevant products becomes simpler and
more accessible.6  These changes have also allowed for more efficient ad-
vertising, connecting businesses with consumers who want to purchase
their products and services.  Further, technology has created healthy com-
petition, which encourages consumers to compare prices and thus re-
quires suppliers to lower prices and adjust to market prices.  At the click of
a button, customers can find a desired product or service at the best price
and desired level of quality.7  Nowadays, almost any service, including
making a doctor’s appointment, requesting a passport extension, retriev-
ing medical documents, filing court documents, and more, can be per-
formed from the comfort of one’s home.8  Such changes and
technological developments have led to the increased use of mobile de-
vices and digital apps, and consequently, to the signing of many ToS and
PPA that define the legal relationship between users and mobile app
providers.
ToS are adhesion contracts that govern the legal relationship between
digital apps and their users.  Users must accept ToS in order to use the
offered service.9  ToS typically contain sections pertaining to some, or all,
4. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for
Big Decisions, 64 STAN.  L.  REV.  ONLINE 63, 64–65 (2012).
5. See Gil Appel et al., The Future of Social Media in Marketing, 48 J. ACAD. MAR-
KETING SCI. 79, 79, 84 (2019).
6. See Avita Katal et al., Big Data: Issues, Challenges, Tools and Good Practices, in
2013 SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY COMPUTING (IC3) 404
(2013).
7. See Kiran Baktha et al., Social Network Analysis in Healthcare, in INTERNET OF
THINGS AND BIG DATA TECHNOLOGIES FOR NEXT GENERATION HEALTHCARE 309
(Chintan Bhatt et al.  eds., 2017).
8. See Charith Perera et al., Big Data Privacy in the Internet of Things Era, 17 IT
PROF. 32 (2015).
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of the following topics: definition of keywords and phrases; user rights and
responsibilities; users’ and providers’ accountability for online actions, be-
havior, and conduct; payment details such as membership or subscription
fees; a dispute resolution clause detailing the dispute resolution process,
which typically includes arbitration, and ofttimes the limited rights of
users to take a claim to court; disclaimers and limitations of liability, which
clarify the providers’ legal liability for damages incurred by users; and
other topics that will be discussed extensively in the typology Section.10
PPA are statements or legal documents that disclose some or all of the
ways a party gathers, uses, discloses, and manages customer data.11  Within
PPA, the app provider discloses to the customer what specific information
will be collected, whether the information will be confidential or trans-
ferred to third parties, for what purpose the information will be used, how
the information can be deleted or changed, what processing is done to the
information, etc.12  The exact contents of any particular PPA depend
upon the applicable laws and may need to address different requirements
across geographical boundaries and legal jurisdictions.13
ToS and PPA, each within the scope of their responsibilities, are sup-
posed to protect the rights of users and provide them with tools to provide
“informed consent”14 when they consider the costs and benefits of using
the app.  The meaning of informed consent in the context of privacy law,
and in standard contracts and consumer protection contexts, is that the
object of information has the necessary information to decide whether to
consent to the provision of information and its uses, including the transfer
of information to third parties.15  Building on the work of sociologist Alan
10. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013).
11. This Article proceeds from the premise that PPA, similar to ToS, are con-
sidered binding legal contracts.  However, from a legal perspective, there is no
clear consensus around PPA as legally binding contracts. See Oren Bar-Gill et al.,
Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer
Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 28–30 (2017); Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your
Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57,
91–92 (1999).
12. See Kumar et al., supra note 2, at 1; Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Trustworthy
Privacy Indicators: Grades, Labels, Certifications, and Dashboards, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
1409, 1412–13 (2019).
13. See ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 97 (1997).
14. The term “informed consent” is derived from the medical world.  The
term has been defined as a “procedure for ensuring that research subjects under-
stand what is being done to them, the limits to their participation and awareness of
any potential risks they incur.” SOCIAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL GUIDE-
LINES 28 (2003).
15. See Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
Article 4(11) refers to consent that is “specific, informed and unambiguous.” Id. at
34.  Section 7 of the GDPR provides further instructions about consent.  Id. at 37.
8
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Westin, Michael D. Birnhack interprets the phrase “informed consent” as
individuals’ ability to exercise control over their autonomous unit.16  This
ability is only possible when people understand the meaning of the re-
quested action.  In other words, the ability for consent occurs when indi-
viduals realize that information about them will be collected, agree to the
collection of information, and agree to the various uses of that informa-
tion.  Consent is the core of users’ abilities to protect themselves from
possible infringements of their rights.  It allows users the freedom of
choice and control to decide whether and how to use a particular app.
As mentioned, ToS and PPA are the primary means of obtaining in-
formed consent from individuals.  Thus, the way in which ToS and PPA
are implemented becomes an important regulatory mechanism for pro-
tecting users’ rights.  These agreements should clearly reveal to users all
the information needed to make an informed decision regarding whether
and how to use any particular app.17
However, ToS and PPA are lengthy and complex, making it almost
impossible for typical users to fully understand what they are agreeing to
when they sign these documents.18  In essence, this lack of understanding
creates a situation of uninformed consent and unethical usage of user
data, otherwise known as “ethical risks.”  As will be described in further
detail in the following sections, the different ethical risks can be divided
into three groups:
(1) Ethical risks arising from the content of ToS and PPA.  This group of
risks is the focus of Part III and includes seven primary risks.  These seven
risks are: uninformed consent, restricting user legal action, limited reada-
bility, profiling, processing user information, tracking user information,
and third-party data transfers.  The seven primary risks are comprised of
multiple secondary risks, which will be presented in detail in the typology
Section.
(2) Ethical risks that stem from users’ lack of informed decision-making re-
garding ToS and PPA.  This group of risks focuses on human behavior and
the way that app users perceive ToS and PPA.  Among the risks that will be
presented are the tendency of users not to read ToS and PPA and not to
attribute adequate weight to the cost of privacy violations.
(3) Ethical risks that are external to ToS and PPA.  This group of risks
includes risks that users cannot identify in ToS or PPA because they are
external to the service relationship of the app provider and the user.
Among the risks that will be presented are information security failures
and identity theft.
16. Michael D. Birnhack, Control and Consent: The Theoretical Basis of the Right to
Privacy, 11 L. & GOV’T IN ISRAEL 9, 41–42 (2007) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
17. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting Over Privacy:
Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S1, S1–S6 (2016).
18. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH.  TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 303, 312–14 (2008); Marotta-Wurgler & Chen, supra note 1, at 96, 110.
9
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These three groups of risks lead to many violations of user rights.
One of the biggest violations is the violation of individual autonomy.  Au-
tonomy refers to individuals’ abilities to make meaningful decisions about
their own lives and behaviors without external intervention.  People have
desires and intentions and often act based on these intentions to choose
the right path for themselves.  They can choose how they want to manage
their lives, for example religiously or secularly, whom they want to marry,
where they want to work, for whom they want to vote, and more.19  As
Joseph Raz describes, “[t]he ruling idea behind the ideal of personal au-
tonomy is that people should make their own lives.”20  This broad under-
standing of individual autonomy gives rise to many other rights, such as
the right to freedom of expression, the right to equality, the right to relig-
ion and religious freedom, the right to privacy, and more.21
From the above description of autonomy, one can conclude that con-
trol is the key to realizing one’s autonomy.  In today’s world, one way to
protect individuals’ autonomy rights and to give them responsibility over
their destiny and decisions is to allow them to control the use of their
information.  In regard to apps, this means that individuals should have
the right to choose with which apps they want to share their information,
but only after being aware of the various risks that exist.  This knowledge
will allow them to make an informed choice of whether they are willing to
accept the risks involved in using the app.  However, if users do not under-
stand the various risks, they will not be able to make an informed decision
regarding their agreement to them.  Because the various ethical risks are
hidden within ToS and PPA, an absurd situation is created: instead of be-
ing a tool that protects users from the risks of using digital apps, ToS and
PPA have become tools that legalize all app providers’ actions, even those
that are considered unethical, because the users have allegedly consented
to them.22
This Article presents the various risks that arise from the use of mo-
bile apps.  It begins by presenting all the risks and then focusing on the
risks that are hidden within ToS and PPA.  It also examines how the vari-
ous risks create violations of user autonomy, explains why the existing ToS
and PPA tools are not sufficient, and provides suggestions for change.  As
part of the presentation of the risks that are hidden within ToS and PPA,
the Article also examines whether consumer protection and privacy pro-
tection legislation in the U.S. and Europe addresses these risks, because
mobile app users are likely to expect to find information about their rights
19. Daniel Susser et al., Technology, Autonomy, and Manipulation, 8 INTERNET
POL’Y REV., June 30, 2019, at 1, 8–9.
20. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
21. See Bart van der Sloot & Sascha van Schendel, Article, Ten Questions for
Future Regulation of Big Data: A Comparative and Empirical Legal Study, 7 J. INTELL.
PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 110, 117, 119, 126 (2016).
22. See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, PRIVATE SPACE: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 99–106 (2010) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
10
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in the key legislative instruments in these domains.  To this effect, the Arti-
cle focuses on four regulation schemes, which represent the state of the
art in these domains:
(1) The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR
is a compilation of mandatory provisions adopted by the European Parlia-
ment, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission
to regulate information issues in European Union (EU) territory.23  The
regulation applies to the collection, retention, and transfer of private indi-
viduals’ personal data and establishes uniform rules for the protection of
privacy.  The GDPR is the most up-to-date and comprehensive regulatory
development in information policy.  It is important to note that, although
the GDPR is a significant law that has drawn praise and been implemented
worldwide, one of its drawbacks is that the law does not address all con-
sumer domains.  Rather, it focuses only on data protection in the private
domain.  The lack of consumer protection is a significant part of the risks
that are reflected in ToS and, therefore, it is important to address this
particular risk as well.  Thus, this Article’s account of ethical risks as they
relate to European legislation refers to both the GDPR and the Consumer
Rights Directive of the EU, which will be explained next.
(2) The Consumer Rights Directive of the EU. This directive aligns and
harmonizes national consumer rules.  For example, the directive defines
the information that consumers need to be given before they purchase a
product, and states that consumers have the right to cancel online
purchases in the EU.  Recently, the directive has been amended by EU
Directive 2019/2161 of November 27, 2019, which increased the enforce-
ment of consumer protection laws.24
(3) The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). California became the
first U.S.  state with a comprehensive consumer privacy law when it en-
acted the CCPA of 2018.25  This Act increases the scope of California re-
sidents’ rights over their personal data and addresses the responsibilities
of organizations in regard to data protection.  The law was enacted on
January 1, 2020, but enforcement of the law began on July 1, 2020.  The
law addresses both consumer and privacy aspects.
(4) The California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA). On November 3, 2020,
California voters approved Proposition 24 (the CPRA).26   The CPRA
amends key portions of the CCPA.  The CPRA gives additional rights to
consumers and places additional obligations on businesses.  The new law
provides additional protections for sensitive personal information, ex-
23. See GDPR, supra note 15.
24. Directive 2011/83/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC
and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 1.
25. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (West 2020).
26. See S. 746, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).
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pands CCPA’s opt-out rights to include new types of information sharing,
and requires businesses to provide additional mechanisms for individuals
to access, correct, or delete data, with a particular focus on information
used by automated decision-making systems.  The CPRA is scheduled to
become operative in 2023.  This Article addresses this law though it has
not yet been implemented, as it complements the CCPA in many aspects
of information protection and addresses ethical risks that the CCPA has
not addressed.  Referring to the two laws together will make it possible to
obtain a complete picture of consumer protection and privacy protection
in California.
II. ETHICAL RISKS OF MOBILE APPS
This Part introduces the concept of ethical risks in mobile apps and
divides risks into categories.  Ethical risks in ToS and PPA refer to prac-
tices or arrangements that are not considered illegal per se but may none-
theless be inappropriate, lead individuals to feel a sense of discomfort, or
result in considerable harm to users.  In other words, ethical risks may be
viewed as the “grey area” of ToS and PPA.  As such, they are more difficult
to detect and manage than strictly illegal practices.
The ethical risks in digital apps are manifold; however, this Article
divides them into three conceptual risk types:
(1) ethical risks arising from the content of ToS and PPA;
(2) ethical risks that stem from users’ lack of informed decision-mak-
ing regarding ToS and PPA; and
(3) ethical risks that are external to ToS and PPA.
This Article focuses on the first category, which will be explained in
detail in Part III.  The two other risk categories pertain to risks that are
external to the content of PPA and ToS.  In this Section, the Article will
briefly introduce the three conceptual risk types, provide examples of risks
from each group, and explain how the various risks harm users’
autonomy.
A. Ethical Risks Arising from the Content of ToS and PPA
This group of risks includes all the risks that are explicitly listed in
ToS and PPA of apps.  Almost every app provider requests that users con-
firm they have read and understood PPA and agree to ToS.  Users must
sign these documents by marking that they have read the statement before
being able to use the app.  The risks that the app providers specify in their
agreements may thus become legal since users have allegedly agreed to
them.
This group of risks may be the most important to acknowledge be-
cause, unlike the other two groups, the risks are controllable by both the
users and the app providers.  If users were exposed to the various risks that
accompany the use of an app through a new type of data protection frame-
12
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work, such as a discovery document that would be accessible and easy to
read, they would be given the opportunity to make an informed decision
on whether to use the app.  Also, if users’ knowledge of the existence of
the risks affects them and prevents them from using apps, app providers
may have an incentive to reduce risks by engaging in genuine risk
management.
Due to the great importance of this group of risks, the Article focuses
on identifying and creating a typology of them.  Therefore, all the risks
associated with this category will be discussed extensively in Part III.
B. Ethical Risks That Stem from Users’ Lack of Informed Decision-Making
Regarding ToS and PPA
One of the major risks that exists in ToS and PPA of digital apps is the
way people treat these agreements.  Most app users view the agreements as
an obstacle to get past on the way to using the app.  They do not read the
agreements and even if they did read them, it would not necessarily affect
their decision about whether or not to use the app.  Additionally, many
users misunderstand the context of ToS and PPA.  Further, when users
choose whether to accept or reject ToS and PPA that violate their privacy,
they act in accordance with bounded rationality principles.27  People have
a set of considerations when choosing whether to use an app and the con-
tent of the agreements and the risks they include therein are not necessa-
rily within the bounds of users’ considerations.28  For example, if all the
user’s friends use an app, they may choose to use it even if the agreements
specify many risks.
This Article proposes to subdivide the group of risks into several sec-
ondary risks as presented below:
1. The Term “Privacy Policy” Misleads Users Into Thinking That Their
Privacy Is Protected
Due to a lack of knowledge regarding the legal significance of PPA,
some users mistakenly believe that the very existence of such a document
means that the app providers will protect their privacy.  “Thus, it is not
surprising that the mere presence” of PPA “inclines [users] to disclose
more personal information.”29  Alarmingly, a 2014 survey of American in-
ternet users found that forty-four percent of the individuals surveyed be-
27. There is significant scholarship regarding the definition of “bounded ra-
tionality.”  John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669
(1996); James G.  March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of
Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978); Bertrand Munier et al., Bounded Rationality Mod-
eling, 10 MARKETING LETTERS 233 (1999); Reinhard Selten, Bounded Rationality, 146
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 649 (1990).
28. See Idris Adjerid et al., A Query-Theory Perspective of Privacy Decision Making,
45 J. LEGAL STUD. S97, S99–S100 (2016).
29. RENÉ ARNOLD ET AL., PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY 3 (2015).
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lieved that the mere posting of a PPA meant that personal data collected
by the company would not be disclosed.30
2. Users Do Not Read the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy Agreements
Because ToS and PPA of apps are usually difficult and cumbersome to
read, users rarely read them.  This behavior appears to be common both
when signing up for new services and when changes are made to PPA and
ToS for services that individuals are already using.  For example, one study
of 543 users found that seventy-four percent of participants accepted ToS
and PPA without reading them at all.  Of the participants who chose to
read ToS and PPA, the majority spent very little time reading and largely
skipped through the text and clicked “accept.”  The average time spent on
reading both PPA and ToS was about fourteen seconds, a length of time
that is clearly insufficient to allow for informed consent or to be consid-
ered as reading the text at all.31
Another study conducted by the British Communications Authority
(Ofcom), published in May 2015, found that users tended to approve ToS
without reading them and that, even when users accessed ToS, they usu-
ally did not read them (the average time viewing ToS was under one min-
ute).32  In addition, another study found that only one or two of every
1,000 software shoppers accessed the license agreements and that most of
those who accessed the agreements read only a small portion.33  Because
users do not read ToS and PPA of digital apps, they are not aware of the
risks inherent in them, leading to a major violation of users’ autonomy
and other rights.  Therefore, users’ consent to these agreements is not
free and informed.
3. Users Do Not Attribute Adequate Weight to the Cost of Privacy Violations
Various studies show that when users perceive many benefits to shar-
ing their information with a particular service—e.g., technological advan-
tages, decreased feelings of loneliness, social connection, lifestyle
improvement—their concern about privacy violations diminishes.  In
other words, the more benefits that users perceive from using an app, the
less they will view the app as posing a danger to them.34  When users
choose whether to approve or disapprove ToS and PPA that violate their
30. See Aaron Smith, What Internet Users Know About Technology and the Web, PEW
RES. CTR. (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/11/25/
web-iq/ [https://perma.cc/LK7C-BYY4].
31. See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet:
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y. 128, 141 (2018).
32. See RENÉ ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
33. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014).
34. See Jaspreet Bhatia, Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and Perceived Privacy
Risk (Apr. 19, 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Carnegie Mellon University) (on
file with Carnegie Mellon University).
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privacy protections, they are likely to follow the principles of bounded ra-
tionality.  The process that users go through to decide whether to approve
ToS and PPA is a process that does not regard the cost of disclosing one’s
personal information.  Users tend to only look at the benefits of using an
app and disregard costs altogether.35
C. Ethical Risks That Are External to ToS and PPA
This group of risks includes risks that users cannot identify in ToS or
PPA because they are external to the service relationship between the app
provider and the user.  These risks are associated with user data that are
gleaned from the app by third parties and used for purposes outside the
scope of the service(s) provided through the app.  This type of informa-
tion transfer usually results from data security breaches from either within
the app or from other companies with which the app works.36  This group
of risks also addresses the possible implications of disclosing and misusing
user information to manipulate users.
The ethical risks of this group can be subdivided into several secon-
dary risks as presented below:
1. Information Security Failures
The smartphone user environment is based on a significant number
of service providers across several commercial layers of the product, in-
cluding the company that manufactures the mobile phone, the company
that develops the operating system of the device, the media companies
that operate the product, the app stores, the app developers, the content
providers, online services, and various third parties (e.g., advertiser net-
works).37  The vast amount of user information that is collected across the
internet, along with the number of actors involved in the information col-
lection, processing, storage, usage, and more, creates great concern for
security breaches of personal information.38  If a problem arises in even
one area in the chain of players, the potential for a data breach by third
parties is heightened.39  In the current era, in which many operations take
place behind computer screens—as opposed to face-to-face interactions—
35. See Adjerid et al., supra note 28, at S114–S115.
36. See Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
CHANGE 11–15 (Isr. Democracy Inst. 2012) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
37. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on
Smart Devices, 00461/13/EN, WP 202, at 2 (Feb. 27, 2013).
38. Id. at 5.
39. See Katharine Kemp, Concealed Data Practices and Competition Law: Why Pri-
vacy Matters, 16 EUR. COMPETITION J. 628, 644–45 (2020).  Examples of security
breaches can be found in a 2016 report by the Israeli Registrar of Databases.  In
one incident, a backup drive of a statistical database of a car insurance company
was stolen.  In another, information on candidates for a Haifa military boarding
school was leaked due to a breach in the Haifa Military Board’s website.  A link to a
data file containing sensitive personal information of applicants was found and
uploaded to the Internet.  The boarding school was found to have failed to fulfill
15
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users have difficulty tracking the location of the information collected
about them and controlling the quality of protection regarding their per-
sonal information.40  A related risk concerns the commercializing of user
information by companies or entities that sell information to third par-
ties.41  In Israel, the Privacy Authority has investigated numerous cases of
information trading.42
2. Identity Theft
One of the major concerns in the era of big data is identity theft.
Identity theft occurs when someone seeks to take over a person’s identity
in various ways, such as stealing credit card details, using the person’s
name to commit a criminal offense, and more.  Often, in cases of identity
theft, it takes a long time for the persons whose identities have been stolen
to discover the theft; even after the identity theft is discovered, it takes a
long time to repair the damage (clearing one’s name in the case of a crim-
inal offense, recovering lost money in the case of credit card theft, repair-
ing one’s damaged reputation, etc.).  This difficulty is exacerbated in the
case of biometric identity theft, a situation in which a person’s physical
features—their iris scans or fingerprints—are stolen from digital databases
and used to impersonate them.43
3. Online Manipulation Based on Collected (and Transferred) Data
Manipulation of individuals involves an attempt to influence them
and change their decision-making process covertly and deliberately.
Targeted advertising based on users’ profiles is meant to manipulate and
influence users’ choices and the reasons for choosing a particular op-
tion.44  Companies combine insights from the fields of psychology,
neuroscience, and behavioral economics with new digital technologies
and social media, to move beyond simply measuring customer behavior to
designing and creating products with the specific goal of forming new
habits.45  In recent years, political campaigns have begun to utilize this
the duty of information security stipulated in section 17 of the Privacy Protection
Law, 1981, due to not having any control or monitoring systems in place.
40. See Altshuler, supra note 36; Birnhack, supra note 22.
41. See Amir Fuchs, Terrorism and Privacy—A Proposal for Rethinking the Tools for
Coping with Terrorism Online, in PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF CHANGE 231, 242–43 (Tehilla
Schwartz Altshuler ed., 2012) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
42. For example, a 2016 investigation by the Privacy Protection Authority in
Israel regarding the trade of medical information revealed that nursing companies
bought medical information of elderly hospital patients to conduct targeted pa-
tient marketing.  For more information about the investigation, see Report of the
Registrar of Databases for 2016, at 16 (published in August 2017).
43. See Kemp, supra note 39, at 646.
44. See Susser et al., supra note 19, at 9.
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tactic by implementing sophisticated algorithms and modeling techniques
to infer voters’ preferences, intentions, and beliefs, link personal charac-
teristics with political beliefs, and specifically target undecided voters.46
Such techniques affect the core of the democratic process, compromising
values that are necessary preconditions for democratic life, such as politi-
cal privacy.47
When these tactics are employed, personal information can be ana-
lyzed and used to affect individuals’ conduct and the choices they make.48
For example, in the 2016 U.S. election campaign, Facebook admitted that
150 million Americans watched advertisements that were sponsored by
Russia.  This was made possible by Facebook’s algorithm, which is de-
signed to “maximize engagement[.]”49  This manipulative action under-
mines individual autonomy in two ways: (1) causing an individual to act in
ways they did not intend; and (2) causing an individual to act for reasons
they did not intend.50
In the following section, the Article will present a typology of the ethi-
cal risks that arise from the content of ToS and PPA.
III. NOVEL TYPOLOGY OF ETHICAL RISKS ARISING FROM THE CONTENT OF
TOS AND PPA
In this Part, the Article identifies the ethical risks in the text of ToS
and PPA through a thematic analysis of the literature in this domain, as
detailed below.  Based on the analysis, the Article proposes a new typology
by classifying these risks in distinct categories.
A. Methodology
The research question that guided the current study was: “What are
the ethical risks that exist in ToS and PPA of digital apps?” To answer this
question, I conducted a qualitative review spanning 178 sources that ad-
dress the risks involved in using digital apps, as well as the risks of big data
and data analysis.  Sources included academic publications, reports con-
ducted by privacy agencies and consumer protection agencies, as well as by
various NGOs, regulations, and governmental and legislative papers.  I
identified sources from legal databases and the internet based on the
keywords “ethical risks” and “digital apps.”  I extracted themes from
sources that were relevant to the topic.
46. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
861, 882 (2014).
47. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426–28 (2000).
48. See Susser et al., supra note 19, at 2–3, 6.
49. Jonathan Freedland, From Peppa Pig to Trump, the Web Is Shaping Us.  It’s
Time We Fought Back, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/nov/17/peppa-pig-donald-trump-internet-social-media-algo
rithms [https://perma.cc/9Z4W-DVEM].
50. See Susser et al., supra note 19, at 1–2.
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To analyze the source text, I employed the widely used process of
thematic analysis that was developed by Virginia Braun and Victoria
Clarke.51  In accordance with this process, after familiarizing oneself with
the various sources, the researcher highlights the topics relevant to the
research question (i.e., related to ethical risks).  Next, the researcher
codes topics into themes and consolidates sets of themes in a table, where
they indicate item names and quotes from the data that exemplify individ-
ual themes.
After completing the table of themes, I examined the table to create a
model summarizing all the different ethical risks.  I compared and com-
bined similar risks, and when I identified a relatively limited number of
risks, I examined and categorized relationships between them as either
primary risks or secondary risks.  In the end, I identified seven primary risk
categories and used them to create the typology of ethical risks arising
from the content of ToS and PPA.
B. Analysis and Results: The Ethical Risks Typology
This Section presents the ethical risks that are typically included in
standard ToS and PPA.  These are classified into seven primary risks, each
of which includes several secondary risks.  Figure 1 graphically represents
these risks.  Additionally, the Article examines four central laws related to
ethical risks identified in this typology—the GDPR, the Consumer Rights
Directive of the EU, the CCPA, and the CPRA.
The various risks are interrelated, and therefore, some secondary risks
cross the bounds of several primary risks.  Nevertheless, the separate classi-
fications were maintained to facilitate lay readers’ understanding and cre-
ate a clearer and simpler typology that is practical and can be
implemented effectively.
51. Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke, Thematic Analysis, in 2 APA HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 57 (Harris Cooper et al. eds., 2012); Victo-
ria Clarke & Virginia Braun, Thematic Analysis, 12 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 297 (2017);
see also Deborah Anderson et al., Reviewing the Literature Using the Thematic Analysis
Grid, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH METHOD-
OLOGY FOR BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 455; Cecily Young et al., Hindering
Resilience in the Transition to Parenthood: A Thematic Analysis of Parents’ Perspectives, J.
REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL., May 22, 2020.
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• Misleading or unclear language
• Difficulty of navigation
• Mandatory arbitration
• Choice of law
• Choice of jurisdiction
• Limitation of liability
Limited user data control
• Inability to delete user account data
• Inability to condition over a specific clause
• Content removal clause
• Unilateral termination clause
• Unilateral change clause
• Unilateral changes of financial charges
Unspecific consent to the service provided
• Broad purpose limitation







• Tracking user activities while user
is not using the app (cookies)
• Creation of user profiles that
negatively affect future opportunities
• Personal information that may be
used to discriminate
• Using profiles for undeclared
purposes



















According to the results of the research, the various risks can be di-
vided into seven primary risks:
1. Uninformed Consent
In the face of significant potential for violations of user rights, ToS
and PPA are the principal means for obtaining users’ consent to the utili-
zation of their personal information.  However, the attributes of ToS and
PPA create heightened ethical risks that cast doubts on users’ ability to
grant their informed consent for personal data use.52  App providers re-
quire users to consent to ToS and PPA to use apps, but because the agree-
ments are full of hidden risks, of which users are either unaware or to
which they do not attach sufficient importance, the users’ consent is sim-
ply a rubber stamp of approval rather than true, free, and informed
consent.53
The meaning of informed consent is that the object of information
has the necessary knowledge to decide whether to consent to the provision
of information and its processing, including its transfer to third parties.54
This interpretation corresponds to the definition of the term “informed
consent” in Article 4 of the GDPR, such that in order for users to provide
informed consent, the app provider must provide users with details re-
garding the use of their personal information.55  Such details would in-
52. See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 1, at 22.
53. See Daniel Nunan & Baskin Yenicioglu, Informed, Uninformed and Participa-
tive Consent in Social Media Research, 55 INT’L J.  MKT.  RES. 791 (2013).
54. See Birnhack, supra note 16, at 100.
55. See GDPR, supra note 15, Article 4.
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clude a description of information that will be collected and stored, the
purposes for which the information will be processed, the type of informa-
tion to be processed, and the risks that arise from data transfer.  Consent
must be unequivocal and objective; it cannot be implied.56
The informed consent risk has earned senior status and broad protec-
tion under the GDPR, a law which regards consent as one of the core
elements of privacy protection.  As such, the GDPR addresses the matter of
consent across a number of the articles of the law.  The basic requirements
for valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 and specified further in
recital 32 of the GDPR.57  Consent must be freely given, voluntary, spe-
cific, informed, and unambiguous.  In addition, there are many other sec-
tions in the GDPR that refer to consent.58  In the CCPA, unlike the GDPR,
there is no specific reference to informed consent.  Rather, the reference
to informed consent is indirect across different sections.59
The CPRA extends the reference given to the term consent in the
CCPA.  Section 1798.140, the definitions section, describes the term con-
sent as “any freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication
of the consumer’s wishes by . . . a statement or by a clear affirmative ac-
tion, signify[ing] agreement to the processing of personal information re-
lating to the consumer for a narrowly defined particular purpose.”60  The
section states that:
[a]cceptance of a general or broad terms of use, or similar docu-
ment, that contains descriptions of personal information process-
ing along with other, unrelated information, does not constitute
consent.  Hovering over, muting, pausing, or closing a given
piece of content does not constitute consent.  Likewise, agree-
56. See GDPR, supra note 15, recital 32.
57. See id., Article 7 and recital 32.
58. See id. passim. The relevant GDPR articles are: (Art. 4 GDPR) Definitions;
(Art. 6 GDPR) Lawfulness of processing; (Art. 7 GDPR) Conditions for consent;
(Art. 8 GDPR) Conditions applicable to child’s consent in relation to information
society services; (Art. 9 GDPR) Processing of special categories of personal data;
(Art. 22 GDPR) Automated individual decision-making, including profiling; (Art.
49 GDPR) Derogations for specific situations. Id. The relevant Recitals are: (32)
Conditions for Consent; (33) Consent to Certain Areas of Scientific Research; (38)
Special Protection of Children’s Personal Data; (40) Lawfulness of Data Process-
ing; (42) Burden of Proof and Requirements for Consent; (43) Freely Given Con-
sent; (50) Further Processing of Personal Data; (51) Protecting Sensitive Personal
Data; (54) Processing of Sensitive Data in Public Health Sector; (71) Profiling;
(111) Exceptions for Certain Cases of International Transfers; (155) Processing in
the Employment Context; (161) Consenting to the Participation in Clinical Trials;
(171) Repeal of Directive 95/46/EC and Transitional Provisions. Id.
59. For example, section 1798.105 states that if users have agreed to their
information not being deleted, it can remain in the system.  Another example is
section 1798.120, which deals with transferring information to third parties and
states that user consent is required to transfer the information. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.105, 1798.120 (West 2020).
60. Id. § 1798.140.
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ment obtained through use of dark patterns does not constitute
consent.61
From the section it is clear that the consent should be specific and
unequivocal regarding a document that is clearly written to the reader.
The overall risk of users not granting their free and informed consent can
be classified into two distinct primary risks.
a. Unspecific Consent to the Service Provided
ToS and PPA require users to confirm that they have read the terms
and that they specifically understand and agree to them.  However, such a
request poses a risk because users cannot give specific consent to the ser-
vices provided.  This inability to provide specific consent results from the
following secondary risks:
i. Broad Purpose Limitation
The bargaining power of app providers frequently enables them to
obtain consent from users for a broad range of conduct.  By bundling con-
sent to multiple and separate practices, digital platform providers push
users to enter into contracts without allowing them to choose which data
collections, uses, and disclosures they agree to and which they do not.  As
a result, users may find themselves providing nominal consent to data
practices with which they feel uncomfortable in order to access a digital
platform’s services.62
Users do often freely share their personal data.  For example, users
often post personal information on social network websites; in many other
instances, they consent to the collection of their personal data by busi-
nesses and service providers.  However, that consent is generally limited to
the transaction at hand—for example, to enable lenders to evaluate mort-
gage apps or companies to ship items purchased online.  Rarely, if ever,
are users asked about the aggregation of their data for secondary uses—
uses that they likely do not even contemplate when their data is first col-
lected.  Nevertheless, users are considered to have agreed to such uses be-
cause the consent in ToS and PPA is so broad that it includes almost every
action that can be taken with users’ information.63  Such broad consent
cannot constitute specific and informed consent as the app provider does
not clarify specific information regarding data usage, but rather provides
only general information.  This leads to a situation in which users are not
aware of the uses to which they are agreeing.
Various regulators are aware of this risk and have tried to limit it in
legislation.  For example, GDPR Article 6(4) stipulates the purpose limita-
61. Id.
62. See AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS
INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, at 400 (2019).
63. See Kemp, supra note 39, at 643–44, 647–49.
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tion principle, which is further elaborated in recital 50.64  This principle
specifies that personal data should only be collected for the specific pur-
pose that is indicated to the user in advance, and that the data should not
be used for any other purpose.  “Vague and abstract purposes, such as
‘promoting consumer satisfaction,’ ‘product development’ or ‘optimizing
services,’ are prohibited.”65  Article 5 of the GDPR additionally references
this risk principles relating to the processing of personal data.  According
to the Article, user information processing should be “for specified, ex-
plicit, and legitimate purposes[,]” and the information should not be fur-
ther processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.  The
CCPA also refers to this ethical risk in section 1798.100(b).66  According
to this section, the user must be informed of the purpose for which the
information was collected; however, there is no reference to the fact that
the purpose needs to be specific.  In the CPRA, there is an extension of
section 1798.100(b) in section 1798.100(b)(2), which stipulates that a
company shall not collect additional categories of sensitive personal infor-
mation or use sensitive personal information collected for additional pur-
poses that do not match the disclosed purpose for which the sensitive
personal information was collected, without providing the consumer with
a notice consistent with section 1798.100(b)(2).67
Nevertheless, app providers often set very broad definitions for the
purpose of collecting information, such as “the legitimate uses of the app”
or “necessary to provide services.”  Because this terminology might give
the user the positive impression that app providers are only collecting in-
formation necessary to provide services and are only using the data for
legitimate purposes, it is unethical.  Such a definition enables data collec-
tion for a wide range of purposes without providing users a genuine expla-
nation about what information is collected about them and for what
purposes.
ii. Lack of Transparency
A key data protection risk is lack of transparency.  Many apps fail to
meaningfully inform their potential users about the types of personal data
that the app may process, as well as the purposes of data processing.
Other app providers are silent on these matters.  Therefore, ToS and PPA
do not enable users to understand the extent of risk of using a certain
app.68  The lack of transparency is closely related to a lack of free and
64. See GDPR, supra note 15, recital 50.
65. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection
Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. COMM. TECH. L. 65, 77–78 (2019);
Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV.
995, 1005–09 (2017).
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b).
67. Id. § 1798.100(b)(2).
68. See, e.g., FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, June 2012 FPF Mobile Apps Study
(2012); Candida Leone, Transparency Revisited—on the Role of Information in the Re-
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informed consent.  When users receive only partial information about an
app and the possible risks of using it, they cannot make an informed deci-
sion about whether to use the app.69
When it comes to transparency, individuals must be given clear infor-
mation on what data is processed, including data observed or inferred
about them.  Further, users should be better informed on how, and for
what purposes, their information is used.  This transparency should in-
clude, when relevant, the logic used in algorithms that produce assump-
tions and predictions about them.  Many app providers do not offer this
information to the user.70  Examples of this lack of transparency are evi-
dent in ToS and PPA of various widely used apps such as Twitter, What-
sApp, and Dropbox, all of which are silent on many ethical risks, inter alia,
how user information is processed, how the app provider secures user in-
formation, and complete purposes of user information.
The GDPR stipulates that individuals have a right to be informed
about the collection and use of their data.  This provision has led to a
variety of information obligations by the app provider.  The law differenti-
ates between two cases: personal data that is directly obtained from the
data subject and personal data that is indirectly obtained.71  When data is
obtained directly from data subjects, individuals must be immediately in-
formed about processing purposes and legal bases, any intentions to trans-
fer personal data to third parties, the duration of storage, their own rights,
the ability to withdraw consent, the right to complain about the authori-
ties, and more.  If personal data is not obtained directly from data sub-
jects, users must be provided with the aforementioned information within
a reasonable time period (i.e., within a month at most).72
The CCPA refers to this ethical risk of lack of transparency in section
1798.110, which defines a list of issues about which users have the right to
receive information from the businesses that collect their personal data.73
These topics include the type of personal information collected, catego-
ries of sources from which personal information is collected, the purpose
cent Case-Law of the CJEU, 10 EUR.  REV. CONT. L. 312 (2014); Marco Loos & Joasia
Luzak, Wanted: A Bigger Stick.  On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online
Service Providers, 39 J. CONSUMER POL’Y. 63, 86–88 (2016); Ellen Wauters et al., Opti-
mizing Transparency for Users in Social Networking Sites, INFO, Sept. 2014, at 8; Thomas
Wilhelmsson, Cooperation and Competition Regarding Standard Contract Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 49, 55 (2006).
69. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures:
An Experimental Test, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S42 (2016); Hoofnagle et al., supra
note 65, at 77.
70. See European Data Prot.  Supervisor, Opinion 7/2015, Meeting the Challenges
of Big Data, at 6 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publicat-
ion/15-11-19_big_data_en.pdf ]https://perma.cc/6NND-8B3Y].
71. These two circumstances are referenced in Article 13 and Article 14 of the
GDPR, respectively.  GDPR, supra note 15, Articles 13–14.
72. Id. Article 14.
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110.
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for which information is collected, third parties that can access to the in-
formation, and more.
b. Limited User Data Control
Within this risk, a number of secondary risks can be included, which
increase the power gaps between users and app providers and limit the
power of users to control their information and also to provide free and
informed consent to use the application.  The risks are:
i. Inability to Delete User Account Data
Under Article 17 of the GDPR, individuals have the right to have per-
sonal data erased.  This right is also known as the “right to be forgotten.”74
Users have a right to data erasure when their personal data has been un-
lawfully processed or is no longer necessary for processing purposes, or
when the information is inaccurate or no longer relevant.  The right to
erasure also applies when data subjects withdraw consent.75
Like the GDPR, the CCPA also gives users the right to delete informa-
tion about themselves and obligates businesses to notify users of their right
to delete their information.  This right is specified in section 1798.105.76
The CPRA requires businesses to provide additional mechanisms for indi-
viduals to access, correct, or delete data, with a particular focus on infor-
mation used by automated decision-making systems.77
Although required by law, some companies fail to comply with these
obligations and do not allow their users to delete information that has
been collected from their accounts.  Some companies do erase the infor-
mation, but they go about it unethically; they may take a long time to
delete the personal data, or require users to go through a complex proce-
dure to have their data erased.78
Examples of violations of the right for users to delete their account
data and unethical behavior can be found in a study that looked at the
data deletion mechanisms presented in the privacy policies of 108 web-
sites.  According to the study:
41 websites offered the option to have the account permanently
deleted, and 13 allowed visitors to temporarily suspend or deacti-
vate their account . . . .  Ninety of 108 websites offering deletion
74. See Jerome Squires, Note, Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (European Court of Justice, C-131/12, 13 May 2014), 35 ADEL. L. REV. 463
(2014).
75. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 65, at 78.
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020).
77. Reference to these issues is found in sections 1798.105, 1798.130, and
1798.145.
78. See Hana Habib et al., An Empirical Analysis of Data Deletion and Opt-Out
Choices on 150 Websites, in FIFTEENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
387, 395 (2019), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups2019-habib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5JN-QBBQ].
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did not describe a time frame in which a user’s account would be
permanently deleted and only four policies stated that informa-
tion related to the account would be deleted “immediately.”  An-
other three claimed the time frame to be 30 days, and two
websites said the deletion process could take up to one year.79
ii. Inability to Condition Over a Specific Clause
The choice to accept ToS and PPA is often binary; in other words,
people are forced to either accept ToS and PPA as a whole or forego the
possibility of using the web or mobile app altogether.80  Users cannot pro-
vide their consent to only specific provisions of PPA and ToS.  Therefore,
by accepting the agreements, they agree to all the terms.  For this reason,
users often have no means of influencing the content of PPA and ToS.81
The risk of inability to condition over a specific clause is not mentioned in
the GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive of the EU, the CCPA, or the
CPRA.
iii. Content Removal Clause
A content removal clause specifies the conditions under which service
providers may remove user content.  User content refers to the content
that users create, and it is considered to be their intellectual property.
Users have the expectation that content they have created or uploaded to
an app is their own, and that they will not be denied access (or ownership)
to it.  However, many apps operate unethically and state in their ToS and
PPA that they can remove user content at their discretion without notify-
ing users in advance or obtaining their consent.82  As such, they limit
users’ power over the content they create in the app and, as a result, they
limit users’ proprietary rights and hurt users’ reasonable expectation of
having unrestricted access to content created by them.
App providers should define the specific conditions under which user
content will be justly removed.  It is unethical if providers may remove user
content at their sole discretion, at any time and for any or no reason, with-
out notifying users or providing the possibility for users to retrieve the
content.  App providers must respect users as content creators, as well as
users’ property rights over the content.  The issue of involuntary user con-
79. Id. at 395.
80. See SANCHARI DAS ET AL., Privacy Preserving Policy Framework: User-Aware and
User-Driven, at 2 (2019).
81. See Fred H.  Cate, The Limits of Notice and Choice, 8 IEEE SECURITY & PRIV.
59, at 60 (2010); Marco Lippi et al., CLAUDETTE: An Automated Detector of Potentially
Unfair Clauses in Online Terms of Service, 27 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 117, at
119, 125 (2019); Florian Schaub et al., Designing Effective Privacy Notices and Controls,
21 IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 70, at 72 (2017).
82. See Marco Lippi et al., Automated Detection of Unfair Clauses in Online Con-
sumer Contracts, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 145, 145–54
(Adam Wyner & Giovanni Casini eds., 2017); Lippi et al., supra note 81.
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tent removal is not addressed in the GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive
of the EU, the CCPA, or the CPRA.
iv. Unilateral Termination Clause
The unilateral termination clause gives app providers the right to sus-
pend or terminate service or user contracts on their own initiative and for
any reason without notifying the user.  This clause only sometimes details
the circumstances under which providers have this right.83  Clauses stipu-
lating that service providers may suspend or terminate the service at any
time for any or no reason, and without notice to the users, are unethical
because such behavior would create constant uncertainty for users.  Users
chose to use the app, added personal content to it, and established per-
sonal assets in it.  Users are thus dependent on the service provided by the
app and expect to continue receiving this service.  However, this clause
allows app providers the ability to suddenly decide to suspend or termi-
nate the service.  If users knew what behaviors would end service delivery,
they could avoid those behaviors, and they would assume responsibility if
the service was terminated due to unwanted behavior.  However, if app
providers can terminate service for any reason, users do not have the abil-
ity to exert any control or to know when to expect service termination.84
The risk of the unilateral termination clause is not considered in the
GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive of the EU, the CCPA, or the CPRA.
v. Unilateral Change Clause
The unilateral change clause specifies the conditions under which
service providers can amend and modify ToS or the service itself.  ToS and
PPA that users agree to at the beginning of service will not necessarily be
valid when users decide to disconnect from the app or make changes to
their accounts.85  Such a clause has always been considered potentially un-
fair because it protects service providers against any claims by users regard-
ing the service and terms.86  App providers are given the opportunity to
pass responsibility onto users to log in and review the updated terms peri-
odically.  Given the number of apps with PPA and ToS that users sign, it is
impossible for any individual users to keep themselves informed of the
new terms in this way.87  A typical unilateral change clause includes
83. See Lippi et al., supra note 81, at 125.
84. See Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analysis of
the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, 19 INT’L. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 187,
203–04 (2011) (discussing data preservation issues after contract termination);
Loos & Luzak, supra note 68, at 74–75.
85. See Loos & Luzak, supra note 68, at 67–72 (discussing unilateral changes
of contractual terms by online service providers).
86. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 149.
87. See Yair Amichai-Hamburger & Oren Perez, Anonymity and Interactivity on
the Net: The Right to Privacy as a Multi-Dimensional Concept, in PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
CHANGE 201 (Tehilla Schwartz Altshuler ed., 2012) (Hebrew); Kemp, supra note
39.
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sentences like, “The services may change from time to time, at our discre-
tion”; “We retain the right to create limits on use and storage at our sole
discretion at any time; or “We may revise these terms from time to time.”88
This risk demonstrates the extreme power gap that exists between
users and app providers.  Additionally, the risk also directly concerns the
matter of consent.  After all, when app providers make a change to the
agreement without notifying users of the change, it effectively means that
the change occurs without user consent, and therefore, reflects a new con-
tract.  Even if app providers announce that they are modifying the agree-
ment and allow users to decide if they choose to accept the new terms, it
still may not be ethical.  For example, if the new terms are worse for users
than those included in the original agreement, and users have already de-
veloped a dependency on the app, most users will end up agreeing to the
terms.  Thus, this consent is considered uninformed consent.
The issue of the unilateral change clause is not addressed in the Con-
sumer Rights Directive of the EU, the CCPA, or the CPRA.  Although the
GDPR does not address this risk directly, it may be that this practice un-
dermines the conditions of informed consent and purpose limitation, two
issues described earlier.  In that case, the unilateral change clause may be
prohibited under the GDPR, at least with respect to data practices.  How-
ever, without a direct reference to the topic, users will not necessarily pay
attention to the issue or realize that the issue is addressed in legislation.
vi. Unilateral Changes of Financial Charges
Many apps either indicate in their descriptive headline that they are
free of charge or present the cost of usage in capital letters.  However, ToS
clauses may award the app provider a unilateral right to modify price
terms.  For example, a clause may state that there will be a financial charge
for using the app a year after it is downloaded, or that certain services that
the app provides will be charged for a fee.  Such clauses are considered
unethical if ToS does not specify the conditions under which the price
may be changed and the criteria for calculating the change.89 Also, such
clauses are considered unethical if users do not have the right to termi-
nate the contract after having been informed that the app provider indeed
wishes to charge a fee.90  The risk of the unilateral changes of financial
charges is not addressed in the GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive of
the EU, the CCPA, or the CPRA.
88. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 148–49.
89. See Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutional Reasoning in Private Law: The Role of
the CJEU in Adjudicating Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 21 EUR. L.J. 599 (2015);
Bert Keirsbilck, The Erga Omnes Effect of the Finding of an Unfair Contract Term:
Nemzeti, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1467, 1471–72 (2013).
90. See Loos & Luzak, supra note 68, at 68–69; Peter Rott, The Adjustment of
Long-Term Supply Contracts: Experience from German Gas Price Case Law, 21 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 717 (2013).
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2. Restricting User Legal Action
According to Article 3 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC from
April 5, 1993, on unfair terms in consumer contracts, a contractual term is
unethical if “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a signifi-
cant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”91  Companies include provi-
sions in their PPA and ToS that may be unethical if their content is unex-
pected from the point of view of the users, or if they limit legal action in a
prohibitive way that undermines consumer protection or privacy protec-
tion.  These provisions include mandatory arbitration, choice of law,
choice of jurisdiction, and limitation of liability, as detailed below.
This primary risk and its secondary risks are not addressed under the
four laws.  The GDPR, the CCPA, and CPRA do not refer to these risks at
all.  The Consumer Rights Directive of the EU also does not address this
primary risk and its secondary risks, but it does direct each state to con-
sider these risks in accordance with state laws of both consumer protection
and contract law.  These risks are addressed in other laws, such as laws that
deal with contracts in general, and uniform contracts in particular.  How-
ever, from the users’ points of view, this is problematic because reasonable
users without legal knowledge will seek to determine their legal rights in
legislation that is most relevant to the document that they are reading.
For example, the Consumer Protection Law is most relevant to ToS and
the Privacy Protection Law is most relevant to PPA.  In practice, however,
the reference to risks is scattered across various pieces of legislation, so it
becomes very difficult for users to determine their rights according to leg-
islation.  This issue raises another unethical behavior: there is no single
piece of legislation that uses can review to understand their rights under
PPA and ToS.
a. Mandatory Arbitration
Mandatory binding arbitration is a contract provision that requires
the parties to resolve disputes regarding the contract through arbitration
rather than through the court system or other forms of dispute resolu-
tion.92  Mandatory binding arbitration may require the parties to waive
specific rights, such as their right to appeal a decision.93  Moreover, ToS
determine the specific arbitration forum and the procedural and eviden-
tiary rules that will apply.  Because these provisions might not be easily
discoverable in agreements, and many people do not know or reasonably
expect that a contract would remove their ability to pursue an issue in
91. Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 24.
92. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 149–50; Lippi et al., supra note 81, at
126–27; Mitchell Grant, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mandatory-binding-arbitration.asp
[https://perma.cc/SM3F-NREN] (last updated Apr. 20, 2021).
93. Supra note 92.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/1
2021] RISKY FINE PRINT 511
court, many people are not aware that their rights may be significantly
curtailed with the acceptance of the agreements.94
The U.S. court system has approved the use of binding arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts.  For example, according to case law parties
may agree to arbitration under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
under a competing disclosure proceeding in legal proceedings.95  The Su-
preme Court has held that arbitration is a matter of contract, and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the courts to respect the contract
to which both parties agreed.  Although such a clause may be legal, it still
may be unethical in certain cases.  For example, clauses may state that
arbitration takes place in a state other than the state of the user’s resi-
dence and or that arbitration is based on an alternative set of rules.96
b. Choice of Law
A choice of law clause specifies the law governing the relations arising
from the agreement, and the law by which a potential dispute will be adju-
dicated.97  Many apps state that the governing law is of the country in
which their parent company operates.  A question arises as to whether
such a provision can reasonably be expected by the user, and whether it is
enforceable.  In Israel, the supreme court has ruled in a case involving
Facebook that, as a rule, the choice of law clause is valid.98  However, if the
choice of law clause deprives the user of the possibility to make certain
claims, and in cases in which the law is not accessible to the user or does
not have similar characteristics to Israeli law, the choice of law clause may
be regarded as a depriving condition in a standard contract and, as such,
may be canceled.  According to this judgment, a choice of law clause may
be unethical in cases where the law is not accessible to the user (e.g., when
the clause follows the law of an unfamiliar state that a reasonable user
would not expect, or the law of a state is reputed to have very weak con-
sumer protection laws).  Additionally, the clause may be unethical in cases
in which it prevents the user from raising claims that form the root of the
legal process, such as states that do not allow filing class actions, or in
which the clause according to which the user wants to sue does not exist.99
c. Choice of Jurisdiction
A jurisdiction clause specifies the courts that will adjudicate the dis-
putes arising from the contract.  A clause is unethical when it determines
that jurisdiction is limited to a specific place, such as in the city or state
94. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247 (2009); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
95. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
96. Id. at 342–43, 358–59, 364, 366.
97. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 148; Lippi et al., supra note 81, at 122–23.
98. REA 5860/16 Facebook Inc.  v.  Ohad Ben Hamu, (2018) (Isr.).
99. See Loos & Luzak, supra note 68, at 84–86.
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where the parent company of the app is located, regardless of the place of
residence of the user.100 In Israel, the court ruled in the Facebook case
that the forum clause is not valid because users cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to file their lawsuit in California.
d. Limitation of Liability
A limitation of liability clause specifies the amount and types of dam-
ages that an app provider will be obligated to provide to users under the
terms and conditions stated in the service agreement.  Additionally, it
states that the duty to pay damages is limited or excluded for certain kinds
of losses, under certain conditions.  In ToS and PPA, many clauses reduce
and limit the liability of the service provider for damages (such as any
harm caused to the computer system because of malware or loss of data)
and for the suspension, modification, discontinuance, or lack of availabil-
ity of service.101  The boundary between an ethical clause and an unethical
clause is based on the number of issues that app providers remove from
their liability; as the number of excluded liability issues increases, the
clause becomes more unethical.102
3. Limited Readability
According to Article 5 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC from
April 5, 1993, on unfair terms in consumer contracts, “terms must always
be drafted in plain, intelligible language.”103  However, one of the main
reasons that users do not read PPA and ToS is their complex language,
which includes legal jargon that obscures the basic meaning of terms and
misleads users.  Additionally, these documents are long and difficult to
navigate, as detailed below in the description of secondary risks.104  The
agreements are structurally complex for users and difficult to understand,
obstructing informed consent even if users do choose to read them.  This
lack of understanding makes users’ consent a risk in and of itself and high-
lights their lack of control in comparison to app providers.
The difficulty in understanding and reading ToS and PPA is exacer-
bated by the fact that these agreements are signed on a small mobile
phone screen.  Various studies have indicated that people’s attention
when making decisions in front of a mobile phone screen is much lower
than when they make decisions in front of a computer screen.  This reduc-
100. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 148; Lippi et al., supra note 81, at 122.
101. See Lippi et al., supra note 82, at 149; Lippi et al., supra note 81, at
123–24.
102. See Loos & Luzak, supra note 68, at 79–81.
103. See Article 5 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC from April 5, 1993.
104. See Bakos et al., supra note 33, at 31–32; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Mat-
thew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD.
569 (2016).
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tion in attention thus affects the ability to carefully read the documents, as
well as the ability to understand them.105
The risk of limited readability and its secondary risks are addressed in
neither the Consumer Rights Directive of the EU nor the CCPA.  In the
GDPR, this risk and its secondary risks are not discussed directly, but the
principles of purpose limitation and informed consent, which have been
extensively mentioned previously, require clear and comprehensible lan-
guage.  However, even though the GDPR addresses this issue indirectly,
users would reasonably expect to see a direct reference to the topic.  With-
out a direct reference, users may not know that the issue is addressed in
legislation.  The CPRA addresses this risk in several specific sections.  For
example, one section of the CPRA states that a company must provide a
clear and conspicuous link on the business’s Internet homepage(s), titled
“Do No Sell or Share My Personal Information” or “Limit the Use of My
Sensitive Personal Information.”106  Another section states that the com-
pany must provide specific pieces of personal information obtained from
the consumer in a format that is easily understandable to the average con-
sumer, and, to the extent that is technically feasible, in a structured, com-
monly used, machine-readable format, which also may be transmitted to
another entity at the consumer’s request without hindrance.107
a. Ambiguity
PPA of digital platforms are often vague.  A key example of vague
language is the frequent use of the word “may” in digital platforms’ privacy
policies.  The word “may” denote various meanings, including the expres-
sion of uncertainty, permission, possibility, intention, or hope.108  When
used in contract terms, including in a digital platform’s ToS and PPA, the
use of the word “may” give digital platforms significant discretion to per-
form, or not perform, the actions that follow that word.  Users reading a
policy with this language, therefore, cannot accurately determine the ex-
act scope of the user data that the platform will collect from them or how
the data will be used and disclosed.109
105. See Shlomo Benartzi & Jonah Lehrer, THE SMARTER SCREEN: SURPRISING
WAYS TO INFLUENCE AND IMPROVE ONLINE BEHAVIOR 40–43 (2015); Ayelet Sela, E-
Nudging Justice: The Role of Digital Choice Architecture in Online Courts, 2019 J. DISP.
RESOL. 127, 144–45 (2019).
106. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.135 (West 2020).
107. Id. §1798.130.
108. See DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 405–06.
109. See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, 6 I/S J.L.  & POL’Y INFO.  SOC’Y 425 (2010); Reidenberg et al., supra
note 12; Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy,
Norms, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370 (2013).
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b. Complexity
PPA and ToS of digital platforms are often complex.  The complexity
of language makes it difficult for average users to process the information
contained within these policies110 and to decide on a useful course of ac-
tion if there is a problem.
c. Length
PPA and ToS of digital platforms often span many pages; as such, if a
user chose to read them, it would take a long time.111  A review by the
Australian Competition Consumer Commission (ACCC) found that “each
digital platform’s privacy policies, excluding the additional links to sepa-
rate web pages, were between 2,500 and 4,500 words, and would take an
average reader between 10 and 20 minutes to read.  These average reading
times are likely to significantly exceed the time actually spent by consum-
ers trying to read digital platforms’ privacy policies.”112
d. Misleading or Unclear Language
The risk of misleading or unclear language refers to the use of sophis-
ticated words and complicated sentences in ToS and PPA.  This language
obscures the underlying meaning of the terms used and misleads users.113
Many apps use terms such as “granting the right to erase information,”
“allowing information to be corrected,” “using the information only for
the purposes for which it was collected,” and more.  In practice, however,
users are not provided with the tools needed to exercise such rights.
Thus, a situation is created in which users believe they are granted many
rights in an agreement, yet, in practice, it would be impossible for them to
carry out any legal action.
For example, one study that looked at 150 websites found that, in six
instances, the text in a privacy policy referred to an opt-out option, but
that option either did not exist or the website did not provide vital infor-
mation to opt out, such as an email address for sending privacy requests.
Additionally, six websites included misleading information in the privacy
policy text.  Finally, seven websites mentioned user accounts in PPA, but
no mechanisms to create a user account were found on the website.114
110. See DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 405; Ben-
Shahar & Chilton, supra note 69; Yaniv Roznai & Nadiv Mordechay, Access to Justice
2.0: Access to Legislation and Beyond, 3 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 333 (2015).
111. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Article, The Cost of Read-
ing Privacy Policies, 4 I/S A J. L. & POL’Y INFO.  SOC’Y 543 (2008).
112. DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 403 (foot-
note omitted).
113. See Bakos et al., supra note 33.
114. See Habib et al., supra note 78, at 396.
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e. Difficulty of Navigation
Many digital platforms’ terms and conditions are hard to navigate be-
cause of numerous and separate interlinked policies that all contain infor-
mation regarding the digital platform’s data practices.  To understand all
the content that ToS and PPA include, users must additionally read ToS
and PPA of other apps to which ToS and PPA of the app-in-question refer.
Given that each ToS and PPA is long in itself, the additional references
make reading the entire content of ToS and PPA impossible for users.115
This is an ethical risk as this type of practice requires users to also be asso-
ciated with the agreements of other apps because they have given consent
to use a specific app that is bound by additional agreements.  As such,
users are compelled to commit to a contract outside of the one to which
they have directly consented.  Further, terms and conditions are often
presented in a way that is hard to navigate due to disorganized typo-
graphic aspects (e.g., small font size, compressed line height, shortened
line length).116
4. Profiling
Profiling refers to the process of constructing a user profile based on
computerized data analysis.  More specifically, this process refers to the
use of algorithms or other mathematical methods to uncover patterns or
correlations within large quantities of data, which are then aggregated in
databases.  When these patterns or correlations are used to identify or re-
present people, they are called profiles.  Profiles can then be used to draw
inferences and personalize content and services.  Due to people’s limited
understanding of data protection and user information tracking, an enor-
mous amount of information about them can become available to multi-
ple bodies, ranging from advertisers, service providers and other
commercial entities, to governments.  This, in turn, allows those bodies to
build profiles of individuals with the aim of targeted advertising, targeted
treatments, or other means of persuasion.117
The GDPR addresses the risk of profiling, and its secondary risks, in
two main sections: (1) Article 4 (a section that legally defines profiling)
and (2) Recital 71 (a section that outlines what should not be done with
user profiles).  In these sections, the law tries to protect users from the
creation of profiles by only allowing automated processing of information
that could be used to tag a user as a part of a specific group.  In the case of
profiling, the law tries to address both primary and secondary risks, and
even to prevent discriminatory effects on persons based on a number of
criteria, including racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or be-
liefs, trade union membership, genetic aspects, and health status.  The
115. See DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 406.
116. See id.
117. See Sumitkumar Kanoje et al., User Profiling Trends, Techniques and Applica-
tions, 1 INT’L J. ADVANCE FOUND. RES. COMPUTER 119 (2014).
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CCPA is silent in regard to these primary and secondary risks.  The CPRA
addresses the risk of profiling in section 1798.140, the definitions section,
which describes the profile of any type of automated processing of per-
sonal information for the assessment of certain personal aspects relating
to a natural person, and in particular for the analysis or prediction of re-
lated aspects.  According to this law, profiling includes “natural person’s
performance at work, economic status, health, personal preferences, inter-
ests, reliability, behavior, location, or movements.”118  Also, in the regula-
tory section, section 1798.185 (16) states that regulations on access and
rights of revocation of consent should be installed in relation to the busi-
ness use of automated decision-making technology, including profile.119
The risk of the creation of user profiles is twofold.  First, problematic
use can be made of profiles; and second, the very existence of user profiles
is a risk.  These risks are described in the following secondary risks.
a. Creation of User Profiles that Negatively Affect Future Opportunities
Through profiles, people are tagged in particular groups, which then
expose them to receiving particular online publications and internet
search suggestions.  Once a user profile is customized, all advertisements,
sentence completions in web searches, and offered services will be
targeted to the user profile.  Through this process, the “choices”
presented to any particular user end up being based on assumptions about
them.  Those “choices” then determine to which circle the user will be-
long, thus creating a recurrent loop reaffirming the user’s belonging to
that same group, making it difficult to gain exposure to additional choices
and opportunities.120
An individual’s development depends on the opportunities that the
individual is either given or denied.  In the context of big data, several
academics have expressed concerns over the kind of personalization that
occurs with user profiles, particularly how it can narrow people’s life op-
portunities in discriminatory ways.  Predictive algorithms rely on mined
data in order to “learn” from the user’s past; these algorithms operate by
analyzing data and uncovering statistically significant patterns.121  The in-
dividual user’s past is based on assumptions that the respective algorithms
have discovered—for example a person’s physical characteristics, prefer-
ences, habits, personality traits, and any other type of information that is
being tracked and can be inferred.122  Based on this past, the algorithm
118. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140 (West 2020).
119. Id. § 1798.185 (16).
120. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2012);
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.  PROP. 239 (2012).
121. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
122. See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from
Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802 (2013).
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conducts predictive analyses and determines the choices that individuals
will be given.123  In turn, these same “choices” that were presented and
based on prior assumptions are also the choices that determine the subse-
quent assumptions, creating a circular framework.  As such, users remain
within the group in which they were tagged and do not aspire to ad-
vance.124  Sometimes big data is used to make determinations about indi-
viduals; however, these determinations are not based on concrete facts,
and rather on inferences or correlations that may be unwarranted.  Indi-
viduals may be judged not based on what they have done or what they will
do in the future, but on inferences or correlations drawn by algorithms.
These inferences subsequently may suggest to others that the individual
has poor credit or that they will be an insurance risk, that they may be
unsuitable candidates for employment or university admission, and
more.125
b. Personal Information that May Be Used to Discriminate
The aggregation and disclosure of users’ personal information that
occurs in the process of user profiling and segmenting can lead to discrim-
ination, based on users’ online and offline behavior.126  This information
can be used to draw unexpected and negative conclusions about users that
can cause them harm within society and exacerbate social inequality and
distributive injustice.  Profiling allows marketers and retailers to segment
users into distinct groups based on their relative value and expected prof-
itability to retailers.  Thus, weak populations are pushed aside and end up
receiving fewer quality products across all types of services, including in
the medical field.  This leads to a situation in which the wealthy receive
better medical care, including state-of-the-art technologies and more se-
nior and qualified doctors.  Discrimination also occurs in credit ratings
(data on users’ purchases on the Internet is collected to create a credit
rating profile), which leads to particular users being charged more for
services based on their perceived ability to pay.  For example, users who
are perceived unable to pay may be charged higher interest rates or insur-
ance premiums.  Segmentation in the online world, therefore, produces
and reinforces societal inequalities.127
123. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 120, at 239, 253.
124. See Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA ENT. L.J. 803 (2016).
125. See Marijn Sax, Privacy from an Ethical Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF
PRIVACY STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 143–72 (Bart van der Sloot
& Aviva de Groot eds., 2018).
126. See Kemp, supra note 39, at 648–52.
127. See Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH.
L. & POL’Y 41 (2014); Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison & Karen Yeung, Big
Data and Personalized Price Discrimination in EU Competition Law, 36 Y.B. EUR. L. 683
(2017); Karen Yeung, Five Fears About Mass Predictive Personalization in an Age of Sur-
veillance Capitalism, 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 258 (2018).
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c. Using Profiles for Undeclared Purposes
One may assume that ethical and trustworthy service providers would
use information collected from user profiles only if they had users’ explicit
consent, and that they would use that information solely for purposes
specified and only for the benefit of the users.  However, there are service
providers who are less inclined to protect user data and who may use user
profiles for undeclared purposes.  This behavior is unethical as users will
not anticipate the use of their profiles for other needs and will have no
way of controlling how their profile will be used.128
d. Creation of Aggregated Profiles
First-party data profiles refer to any user information that is collected
and synthesized by advertisers themselves.  However, many times advertis-
ers lack data on prospective customers and turn to third-party data
profiles.  Third-party data profiles are based on aggregated information
from varied data pieces and sources that are unknown to the advertiser.
Data profiles collected by third parties are based on a subset of the popula-
tion and are formed according to the way the advertiser brands users and
not according to the true characterization of groups.  As a consequence,
advertisers receive processed profiles, which they then use to create user
profiles.  As such, the connection between the initially collected informa-
tion and the final profile that is created is accidental.129
5. Processing User Information
In general, data processing refers to the collection and manipulation
of data items to produce meaningful information and may involve various
actions, including collection, recording, validation, sorting, summariza-
tion, aggregation, classification, and more.  According to the GDPR
“processing” means “any operation or set of operations which is per-
formed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.”130
The personal data processing risk has earned senior status and broad
protection in the GDPR, which regards the processing of user information
128. See Omar Hasan et al., A Discussion of Privacy Challenges in User Profiling
with Big Data Techniques: The EEXCESS Use Case, in 2013 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS ON BIG DATA 25 (2013); Jamie Yap, User Profiling Fears Real but Paranoia
Unnecessary, ZDNET (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.zdnet.com/article/user-profil
ing-fears-real-but-paranoia-unnecessary/ [https://perma.cc/8SF6-APAW].
129. See Nico Neumann et al., Frontiers: How Effective Is Third-Party Consumer
Profiling? Evidence from Field Studies, 38 MARKETING SCI. 918 (2019); Joel R.
Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of Regulation, 45 J. LE-
GAL STUD. S163 (2016).
130. See GDPR, supra note 15, Article 4(2).
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as being subject to one of the core protections of privacy; therefore, the
GDPR addresses the matter of processing across various sections.131  Ac-
cording to Article 6 of the GDPR, the first principle of data protection
requires that all personal data be processed lawfully, fairly, and transpar-
ently.  A legal (or lawful) basis for processing must be obtained before an
organization can process any personal data.  The GDPR outlines six scena-
rios in which data processing is legally permitted.  Unless an organization
can show that the personal data processing activity fits within one or more
of these scenarios, the action is deemed unlawful.  The six legal bases for
data processing are:
(1) Data subjects have given consent to the processing of their per-
sonal data for one or more specific purposes.
(2) Processing is necessary to carry out a contract to which the data
subjects are a party.
(3) Processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to
which the app provider is subject.
(4) Processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data
subjects.
(5) Processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out
in the public interest.
(6) Processing is necessary for legitimate interests pursued by the app
provider or by a third party, except when such interests override
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms, or when the
data subject is a child.132
In the CCPA, unlike the GDPR, there is no specific reference to infor-
mation processing.  The definition of processing in the CCPA can be
found in section 1798.140.  According to the definition provided, the
processing is “any operation or set of operations that are performed on . . .
personal data” in a manner that renders the personal information no
longer attributable to a specific user without the use of additional informa-
tion.133  The law refers to processing indirectly within other sections, in-
cluding sections that define the purposes for the use of information or the
provision of information to third parties.  The CCPA, in section 1798.185
(dealing with regulation), obligates businesses that process consumers’
personal information to “[p]erform a cybersecurity audit on an annual
basis.”  The audit will define the scope of personal information processing
and instances in which the processing may pose a significant risk to per-
sonal information.  Such businesses must also file a risk assessment with
the California Privacy Protection Agency on a regular basis with respect to
the processing of their personal information, including whether the
131. See id. passim.
132. See id. Article 6; Hoofnagle et al., supra note 65.
133. CAL.  CIV.  CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020).
37
Mizrahi: Risky Fine Print: A Novel Typology of Ethical Risks in Mobile App
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
520 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 483
processing involves sensitive personal information and whether the bene-
fits of processing the information outweigh its disadvantages.134
Many digital apps work in accordance with the law, but nonetheless
process the information in an unethical manner.  The following list of sec-
ondary risks details the ways that digital apps process information in an
unethical manner:
a. Transforming Meta-Data Into Significant User Information
Big data does not start as big data; rather, it is assembled, bit by bit,
from small pieces of data and becomes “big” only when compiled.  When
users decide to sign up for an app, they reveal basic information about
themselves including name, phone number, and address.  They also allow
the app to access details on their device, including contact lists, current
location, the photo gallery and more.  Each of these items may individu-
ally appear innocent and technical, but the processing of this basic infor-
mation reveals much about the user.  For example, access to users’ current
location, in combination with their home address, can indicate informa-
tion regarding their life habits.  Further, accessing users’ photo galleries in
conjunction with their contact lists can reveal insights about the group of
people with whom they socialize.  App providers additionally use essential
information to advertise relevant products to specific users, and some-
times even sell the information to other advertisers.  The data generated
from the technical information is very valuable.  Many times, users are un-
aware that the basic information they have provided has been aggregated
in such a way that becomes much more meaningful and then is used be-
yond the purposes for which it was provided.  Such practices, on the part
of app providers, are illegal and unethical.135
Another concern that is related to this risk is the issue of de-identifica-
tion of personal information.  Information that does not identify the sub-
ject of the information is not subject to the same limitations of the law
and, as such, there is no restriction on its collection, processing, and use.
App providers can collect technical information about users and, as long
as they keep the information unspecific and anonymous, this type of data
collection is permitted by law.  However, due to numerous technological
developments, big data has become even bigger, and data analytics have
become more sophisticated, increasing the ability to de-anonymize data
and make inferences from an accumulation of non-personal data.  For this
reason, concerns have been raised that third parties may try to cross-iden-
134. Id. § 1798.185.
135. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Keynote Address at the Technol-
ogy Policy Institute Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View from
The Lifeguard’s Chair (Aug. 19, 2013) (transcript available at https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-
big-data-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen. pdf [https://
perma.cc/65EJ-WEDF]); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN
DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 176–78 (2014).
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tify information from several sources so that they can, at least, partially
override the mechanisms of anonymity and connect information from the
database to a specific individual.  Thus, the alleged unidentified technical
information becomes identifiable and exposes personal and sensitive in-
formation about the user.136
The GDPR refers to this risk in recital 26 (“Not Applicable to Anony-
mous Data”) by noting that information that could identify the user is still
protected, and specifically anonymized information that could become de-
anonymized is protected as well.  However, non-specific anonymous infor-
mation is not protected.137  The CCPA and the CPRA are silent regarding
this secondary risk.
b. Aggregating and Combining User Information From Multiple Sources
As explained above, the lure of big data often carries with it the risk of
unidentified technical or personal information becoming identifiable.
Modern data practices allow app providers to aggregate personal data
from multiple sources.  Data aggregators compile immense quantities of
personal information about individual users, using data acquired from
app providers that have had direct contact with the users, as well as data
acquired from other data brokers with whom the users have never commu-
nicated.  This information can be used to make inferences about users’
personal characteristics to profile and categorize users, particularly in ways
that can be used to compile lists of users to sell to other app providers and
data brokers.138
This unanticipated collection and combination of information can re-
veal intimate details about the user’s sexual activity, sexual orientation,
religion, political views, level of debt, alcohol or drug consumption, dis-
eases, disorders, insecurities, behavioral biases, financial vulnerability—all
details that the users would likely have never chosen to disclose to the
provider of the downloaded app or other app providers that use the ser-
vices of a data broker.139  Aggregating user information from multiple
sources without the user’s knowledge and consent is unethical.  One ex-
ample of aggregation is social network aggregation, a process in which
companies collect data about users from various social networks such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter for various analyses and other tasks.140
This practice is particularly problematic given the personal nature of these
data.  The GDPR is silent regarding this secondary risk.  The CCPA and
136. For more information on the issue of de-identification, see Tal Z.  Zarsky
& Bar-Ziv Sharon, Privacy’s Identity Crisis: Regulatory Strategies in The Age of De-Identifi-
cation, 2 L.  SOC’Y & CULTURE 125 (2019) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
137. See GDPR, supra note 15, recital 26.
138. See René Arnold et al., Informed Consent in Theorie und Praxis, 39 DATEN-
SCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT—DUD 730 (2015) (Ger); Kemp, supra note 39, at
648–52.
139. See Kemp, supra note 39, at 648.
140. See, e.g., U.S.  Patent No. 7,188,153 (filed Aug. 25, 2006).
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the CPRA define the term “aggregating user information” in section
1798.140 but do not refer to it beyond that.
6. Tracking User Information
Nowadays people’s activities are continuously tracked.  Cellphones
have become surveillance tools and the various apps installed on them
collect minute-to-minute information about location, activities, interac-
tions, preferences, and daily routines.141  Apps collect information about
users for the purpose of monitoring their online behavior.  Users may be
aware that they are disclosing their name, address, mobile phone number,
product preferences, and credit card details.  However, they are much less
likely to be aware that apps track their subsequent internet browsing his-
tory, the way they navigate other apps, and their locations.  The informa-
tion may include the links that users click on and how long they spend on
any particular page, information about browsers and devices through
which users access the app and browsing activity across different sites.
Such detailed tracking grants app providers access to information about
an individual user’s interests, shopping habits, problems they are facing,
and more.142  In other words, individuals are under constant surveillance.
Users are also typically oblivious to the fact that the data they provide
is combined with other personal information collected from other apps
and data aggregators.  The original information disclosed by a user may
seem innocuous, but when combined with continued and unanticipated
tracking of additional behavior, that information can become jeopardiz-
ing.143  When users are knowledgeable of the constant monitoring that
occurs through their cellphones, regardless of the extent to which they are
aware of it, they behave differently than if they are not being monitored;
thus, we can deduce that the tracking of users violates their autonomy.144
The risk of tracking user information, and its secondary risk, are not
addressed in the GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive of the EU, the
CCPA, or the CPRA.
a. Tracking User Activities While Users Are Not Using the App
(Cookies)
The most well-known online tracking technology is online cookies.
Cookies are small pieces of data that app providers store on users’ devices.
141. See Jose Pagliery, “Super Cookies” Track You, Even in Privacy Mode, CNN
BUSINESS (Jan. 9, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/01/09/technology/secur
ity/super-cookies/index.html [https://perma.cc/6LTU-BTRW].
142. See Michael D. Birnhack, Privacy: A Snapshot, 2 L. SOC’Y & CULTURE 9
(2019) (Isr.) (Hebrew); Mike Schroepfer, An Update on Our Plans to Restrict Data
Access on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Apr. 4, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/
restricting-data-access/ [https://perma.cc/WVU3-G52B].
143. See Kemp, supra note 39.
144. See Cohen, supra note 120; Daniel J.  Solove, “’I’ve Got Nothing to Hide”’
and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L.  REV. 745 (2007).
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Apps often use cookies to remember user preferences and deliver a per-
sonalized experience, as well as to gain information for advertising.  Once
an app has dropped a cookie on a user’s computer, the app provider can
continue to access that device; this is how apps can use cookies to track
users from page to page or from site to site.145
First-party cookies are often used by webpages to recall information
about users (for example, contents of their online shopping cart) and to
personalize their experience (for example, displaying the time and
weather at a user’s location).  A more problematic practice is the use of
cookies by third parties (i.e., companies other than the one operating the
app), often for advertising purposes and for tracking users across different
sites.146
7. Third-Party Data Transfers
Third-party data sharing occurs when user data is transferred from
one entity to another, or when one entity allows another entity to access its
collection of user data.  User data can be shared between digital platforms
and a wide variety of third parties, including advertisers, researchers and
academics, advertising partners, data analytics providers, and payment ser-
vice providers.  Large amounts of user data can also be shared between
digital platforms and app developers.147
The main problem with transmitting information to third parties is
that users lack control over their information.  Users agree to the collec-
tion of information by a specific app, but this data may end up being trans-
ferred to many third parties of which users are not aware or with which
they do not have an agreement about data retention.  Thus, users have no
way of knowing where the information ends up, nor whether it is properly
secured and how it will be used.148
The GDPR defines the term “third party” in Article 4(10).  Beyond
providing a definition, the reference in the law to the issue of third parties
is primarily focused on the transfer of data between countries and not
between third parties in general or between subsidiaries.  This is a general
reference to the issue and not a specific reference that addresses the risk;
therefore, reasonable users cannot determine their rights regarding this
risk in this law.
The CCPA defines the term “third party” in section 1798.140(w).  In
addition, the CCPA addresses the sale or transfer of information to third
145. See DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 387.
146. See id.; see also Bhatia, supra note 34; Loos Marco et al., Regulation of Digi-
tal Content Contracts in the Optional Instrument of Contract Law, 19 EUR. REV. PRIV. L.
729 (2011).
147. See Mark Scott & James Kanter, European Officials Accuse Facebook of Mis-
leading Them on WhatsApp Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/business/ eu-facebook-whatsapp-vestager.html
[https://perma.cc/2ZTU-RU3R].
148. See DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT, supra note 62.
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parties in section 1798.115, which deals with users’ right to receive upon
request disclosure of the sale of their personal information to third parties
as well as the reasons for which the information was transferred.  The sec-
tion further specifies the ways that the information can be transmitted.
Another section that relates to the sale or transfer of information to third
parties is section 1798.120, which deals with a user’s right to withdraw con-
sent to the sale of their personal information to third parties.  The CPRA
adds in section 1798.140, the definitions section, a description of what is
considered the sharing of personal information and states that any trans-
fer of personal information to a party that is not a party to the contract
(with or without payment) is considered sharing of the information.
IV. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS
The Article has presented a typology of ethical risks arising from the
content of ToS and PPA, identified through a qualitative review of relevant
sources.  The typology divides these ethical risks into seven categories of
primary risks (each of which includes sub-risks): uninformed consent, re-
striction of user legal action, limited readability, profiling, processing user
information, tracking user information, and third-party data transfers.
These risks lead to a violation of individual autonomy,149 and the under-
mining of users’ self-determination, which are further accentuated by the
fact that users are under constant surveillance.150  Through tracking, app
providers are able to gather a great deal of information about users, which
is then processed into specific profiles per each user.151  As such, the
“choices” presented to users online are not actually user choices, but
rather results based on assumptions about them and are a product of their
profiling.152  Further, the use of persuasive computing techniques creates
a type of brainwashing, which consequently affects users’ conduct and the
choices they make in their lives.
True autonomy occurs when users have the ability to make indepen-
dent and informed decisions.  The manipulative introduction of informa-
tion into the user environment fundamentally interferes with individual
autonomy, thus threatening the ability to make autonomous choices.153
Finally, the existence of such a multitude of risks within ToS and PPA,
regardless of the content, constitutes a violation of user autonomy.  Users’
lack of knowledge regarding these various risks creates a situation in which
users cannot provide free and informed consent to use the apps.  As such,
ToS and PPA may in fact work against their presumed purpose of protect-
ing user rights.  Instead, ToS and PPA often inherently increase the vul-
nerability of users, as they contain language that legalizes all ethical risks.
149. See Grafanaki, supra note 124.
150. See Cohen, supra note 120; Solove, supra note 144.
151. See Kosinski et al., supra note 122.
152. See Cohen, supra note 47; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 120.
153. Susser et al., supra note 19, at 2–3, 6.
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The discussion in previous sections demonstrated how four key pieces
of legislation—the GDPR, the Consumer Rights Directive of the EU, the
CCPA, and the CPRA—address the various risks presented.  The Article
focused on consumer protection and privacy protection legislation be-
cause users are likely to expect to find their rights with respect to ToS and
PPA in these directly related legal instruments.  My analysis of these laws
vis-à-vis the typology of ethical risks in ToS and PPA suggests that standard
practices and tools are still unable to meet the unprecedented challenges
of the digital age.  This inability to keep up with the digital age exists de-
spite many regulatory advances in privacy protection and legislative at-
tempts to align with technological developments and protect individual
rights.  The legislation reviewed does not cover the entirety of the laws that
exist on these risks.  However, the fact that there is no one clear legislative
reference that can guide users in signing these everyday contracts is
problematic.
All four laws are silent regarding several primary risks and secondary
risks.  There is no reference to the secondary risk of inability to condition
over a specific clause; the secondary risk of content removal clause; the
secondary risk of unilateral termination clause; and the secondary risk of
unilateral changes of financial charges.  Further, not one of these four
laws address the primary risk of tracking user information and its secon-
dary risk of tracking user activities while users are not using the app (via
cookies).
In the CCPA—unlike the GDPR, which ascribes great importance to
informed consent and processing user information—there is no specific
direct reference to these main risks.  Instead, the reference to these risks
occurs indirectly, scattered throughout different sections.  The CCPA is
silent regarding a number of primary and secondary risks, including the
primary risk of limited readability and its secondary risks: ambiguity, com-
plexity, length, misleading or unclear language, and difficulty of naviga-
tion.  and the secondary risks of processing user information,
transforming meta-data into significant user information, and aggregating
user information from multiple sources.  In fact, the CCPA defines the
term “aggregating user information” but does not refer to it beyond that.
Additionally, the CCPA does not address the primary risk of profiling and
its secondary risks: creation of user profiles that negatively affect future
opportunities, personal information that may be used to discriminate, us-
ing profiles for undeclared purposes, and creation of aggregated profiles.
The CPRA extends the reference given to the term consent in CCPA.
It defines the term “consent” and even refers to its secondary risks, such as
the risk of broad purpose limitation, and the risk of inability to delete user
account data.  Unlike the CCPA, the CPRA addresses the risk of limited
readability and states that specific sections must be clearly written to the
average user.  Also, the CPRA addresses the risk of profiling, defines what
a profile is, and says that specific regulations dealing with the profile
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should be established.  In addition, with respect to the risk of personal
data processing, the CPRA expands the reference to this risk and adds
regulatory restrictions with respect to information processing.  Regarding
the risk of transferring information to third parties, the CPRA defines the
term “information sharing” not previously defined in the CCPA.  Despite
the legislative progress made by the CPRA, especially regarding aspects of
privacy and information protection, some risks still remain unaddressed,
such as the secondary risk of transforming meta-data into significant user
information and the secondary risk of aggregating user information.
While the GDPR places emphasis on informed consent, it does not
refer to the risk of information transfer to third parties beyond a defini-
tion of this term.  The reference in the GDPR to the issue of third parties
primarily concerns the transfer between countries, and not between third
parties in general or between subsidiaries.  Also, the GDPR does not di-
rectly address the primary risk of limited readability and its secondary risks
ambiguity, complexity, length, misleading or unclear language, and diffi-
culty of navigation.
The European Consumer Protection Law does not address the pri-
mary risk of restricting user legal action or its secondary risks—mandatory
arbitration, choice of law, choice of jurisdiction, and limitation of liability.
Rather, it directs each state to act in accordance with the laws of the state,
both regarding consumer protection and contract law.
The proposed typology indicates that the key laws in Europe and Cali-
fornia that are supposed to address aspects of data, privacy, information
protection, and consumer protection do not sufficiently address signifi-
cant ethical risks in ToS and PPA of digital apps.  If information regarding
the grave risks presented in the typology will continue to be scattered
across various pieces of legislation, users are unlikely to understand and
exercise their rights.  Including all relevant standards within one inte-
grated legislative framework that is more accessible to lay consumers
would be a worthy pursuit.
The typology rectifies the shortcomings of prior frameworks by taking
a more holistic approach and drawing upon expert information from the
field of law.  Previous studies were more limited in that they detailed vari-
ous ethical risks existing only in PPA of digital apps and were focused
solely on deliberate learning purposes.154  In these studies, researchers
used machine learning techniques to map and categorize existing risks
within privacy policies, so as to direct users’ attention to these risks.  How-
ever, these initiatives are based on a risk typology developed by computer
scientists, rather than jurists and content experts in the field.  In addition,
the studies addressed the various risks of a limited privacy breach, as re-
flected in the privacy policies of digital apps but did not address ToS of
apps.  Moreover, the studies mainly focused on the GDPR (rather than
additional pieces of legislation), and very specific types of risks, including
154. See Kumar et al., supra note 2; Tesfay et al., supra note 2.
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data collection, third-party sharing, data security, data aggregation, and
control of data.  These risks concern only information protection and in-
formation security aspects.
The Article expanded the existing framework and examined ethical
risks in both ToS and PPA.  It also addressed the vulnerability caused by
these ethical risks in regard to core rights, including the right to auton-
omy, non-discrimination, freedom of expression, and consumer protec-
tion.  Additionally, the typology includes details of each risk, how the risks
are reflected within ToS and PPA, and the ways in which the various pieces
of legislation address each risk, if at all.  As demonstrated by the Article, it
is not enough to examine the various risks in regard to only the limited
aspect of privacy, as such a narrow examination does not allow for a com-
plete solution to the various problems that exist in these legal tools.  Addi-
tionally, an examination of risks that exist only under the GDPR is also
very limited; as shown, the four laws reviewed are silent on many risks that
exist in ToS and PPA.  Expanding the ethical risks framework, and exam-
ining it within both ToS and PPA, is essential for finding an adequate solu-
tion to the infringement of user rights due to the use of digital apps.
CONCLUSION
This article sheds light on the gray areas of ToS and PPA of mobile
apps—the ethical risks that characterize them.  It presents a novel typol-
ogy of issues hidden within these documents that are not necessarily pro-
hibited by law, but nonetheless may significantly violate individual rights,
such as the right to autonomy, privacy, non-discrimination, freedom of
expression, consumer protection, and property.  Scholars have long been
concerned with identifying ethical risks in legal documents; however, they
have tended to focus only on specific risk groups.  The typology presented
here creates a comprehensive framework for discussing and addressing
the different ethical risks that are embedded in mobile app user agree-
ments.  This analysis enables, in turn, developing a comprehensive tool for
risk analysis and for understanding the inter-relations between the risks.
The analysis suggests that treating one ethical risk may result in a domino
effect that affects (for better or worse) other risks.
The typology has implications for a variety of fields.  For example,
computer scientists can utilize it to develop tools that can more efficiently
identify ethical risks; consumers can review the typology themselves to im-
prove their understanding of ethical risks in ToS and PPA; and mobile app
providers can refer to the typology to create more ethical agreements.  On
a broader level, the risks identified in the current typology can inform
privacy protection and consumer protection regulatory efforts.  Finally, re-
searchers can use the typology as a framework for purposes such as evalu-
ating user perceptions of ethical risks and gaining an understanding of
how knowledge about the significant risks within ToS and PPA influences
people’s decisions about whether to use particular apps.
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